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Balancing Search and Stability: 
Interdependencies Among Elements of Organizational Design 
 
 
Abstract:  We examine how and why elements of organizational design depend on one another.  An 
agent-based simulation allows us to model three design elements and two contextual variables that have 
rarely been analyzed jointly: a vertical hierarchy that reviews proposals from subordinates, an incentive 
system that rewards subordinates for departmental or firm-wide performance, the decomposition of an 
organization’s many decisions into departments, the underlying pattern of interactions among decisions, 
and limits on the ability of managers to process information.  Interdependencies arise among these 
features because of a basic, general tension.  To be successful, an organization must search broadly for 
good sets of decisions , but it must also stabilize around good decisions once discovered.  An effective 
organization balances search and stability.  We identify sets of design elements that encourage broad 
search and others that promote stability.  The adoption of elements that encourage broad search typically 
raises the marginal benefit of other elements that provide offsetting stability.  Hence, the need to balance 
search and stability generates interdependencies among the design elements.  We pay special attention to 
interdependencies that involve the vertical hierarchy.  Our findings confirm many aspects of conventional 
wisdom about vertical hierarchies, but put boundary conditions on others.  We place limits, for instance, 
on the received wisdom that firm-wide incentives and capable subordinates make top-level oversight less 
valuable.  We also identify circumstances in which vertical hierarchies can lead to inferior long-term 
performance. 
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1.  Introduction 
In the diverse literature on organizational design, at least one proposition has gained widespread 
acceptance: the many formal and informal structures, systems, and processes that make up an 
organization’s design affect one another (e.g., Khandwalla 1973; Mintzberg 1979).  Organizations are 
typically seen as “complex entities . . . composed of tightly interdependent and mutually supportive 
elements” (Miller and Friesen 1984: 1) and as “highly integrated system[s] whose performance is 
determined by the degree of alignment among the major elements” (Nadler and Tushman 1997: 23).   The 
marginal costs and benefits associated with any design element depend on the configuration of others.  
For instance, the efficacy of decentralized decision-making may hinge on the incentives, information, and 
training given to middle management.  Management debacles are often interpreted as failures to 
appreciate the systemic nature of organizational design. 
Prior studies pinpoint specific interdependencies among elements of design, but they do not explain 
why interdependencies arise in general.  In this paper, we use an agent-based model of organizational 
decision-making to identify a general, underlying tension that gives rise to interdependencies.  Our results 
show that successful firms balance two opposing needs.  On one hand, to be effective, a firm must search 
broadly for good combinations of decisions; it must not lock in prematurely on the first decent set of 
choices it discovers.  On the other hand, a successful firm must halt its search efforts and stabilize its 
decisions once it finds an outstanding set of choices.  We identify specific elements of organizational 
design that drive a firm toward broad search and others that encourage stability.  The need to balance 
search and stability creates interdependencies among the elements.  Often a firm which adopts an element 
that pushes it toward broad search benefits from a second element that pulls it toward stability.  Prior 
formal models of organizational search tend to overlook these interdependencies because they often grant 
“stability for free:” that is, they assume that firms which discover good decisions through search can lock 
in on those decisions forever.  Contrary to this assumption, we illustrate that organizational elements 
which enable discovery may undermine lock-in. 
Our model allows us to examine the relationships among three prominent elements of formal 
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organizational design: a vertical hierarchy embodied in a CEO, subordinate managers, and a flow of 
information among them; an incentive system that influences whether managers act for the good of the 
overall firm or pursue the parochial interests of their departments; and the decomposition of a firm’s many 
decisions into discrete departments.  We also pay careful attention to two contextual variables: the 
underlying pattern of interaction among a firm’s decisions and the limits on the ability of managers to 
process information and consider alternatives.  These five features surely do not form an exhaustive list of 
the design elements and contextual variables that organizational designers have explored.  However, as 
we discuss in Section 2, they do cover the important classes of considerations in the literature on formal 
organizational design.  Moreover, this limited list of considerations is more than sufficient to illustrate the 
need for balance between search and stability. 
We model the five features using an agent-based simulation derived from research on complex 
adaptive systems (Section 3).  This approach enables us to look simultaneously at all five features, 
distinguishing our work from prior models that have examined only one or two at a time.  Our effort joins 
a growing set of agent-based simulations of human organizations (e.g., Carley and Lin 1997; Carley and 
Svoboda 1996; Levinthal 1997; Axelrod and Cohen 1999; Chang and Harrington 2000).  In our model, 
firms with different organizational designs face a long series of multidimensional decision problems.  
Decisions within each problem interact with one another in a manner controlled by the modeler.  For each 
decision problem, each firm attempts to find a good solution, that is, an effective set of choices.  The 
management team of each firm consists of a very simple hierarchy: a CEO and two subordinate managers.  
Each subordinate manager has purview over a subset of the organization’s decisions, a “department.”  
Starting from a particular configuration of choices, each subordinate considers altering the decisions 
under his command, evaluates the alternatives in light of an incentive system, and makes 
recommendations to the CEO.  The CEO reviews the proposals and accepts the pair of proposals—one 
from each subordinate—that will serve the firm best.  Alternatively, she may overrule her subordinates 
and maintain the status quo for either or both departments.  
Modeled firms differ in their designs: how active a role the CEO takes and how much information she 
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receives from subordinates; whether subordinates are rewarded for departmental success or the 
performance of the firm as a whole; and how firms decompose decisions into departments.  Organizations 
also differ in the cognitive abilities of their CEOs and managers.  By comparing the performance levels of 
firms with different designs across a large number of decision problems, we can isolate how the distinct 
design elements depend on one another.   
To structure our analysis, we focus on the interdependencies between the vertical hierarchy and the 
other organizational elements.  The results of our modeling effort (Section 4) show that a hierarchy which 
actively reviews subordinates’ proposals is often helpful, but circumstances exist under which thorough 
decentralization produces superior performance.  The findings also pinpoint design elements and 
contextual variables that amplify or dampen the value of an active hierarchy.  The results confirm many 
aspects of the conventional wisdom about hierarchies produced by prior observers of organizations, but 
challenge or show boundary conditions for other aspects.  For instance, consistent with received wisdom, 
we find that an active vertical hierarchy tends to be more valuable when interactions among decisions are 
pervasive.  However, this benefit arises only if the information flow in the hierarchy is rich enough.  
Without rich information flow, active hierarchies can lead firms to lock in on suboptimal solutions 
prematurely, leading to worse performance than a firm with a purely passive hierarchy would achieve.  
Similarly, we bound conventional wisdom by showing that firm-wide incentives and capable managers 
are complements to, not substitutes for, an active hierarchy when interactions among decisions are 
sufficiently pervasive. 
To interpret our results (Section 5), we use a landscape conceptualization that has become popular in 
certain formal models of organizational search (Kauffman 1995; Levinthal 1997; Levinthal and Warglien 
1999; McKelvey 1999; Gavetti and Levinthal 2000; Ghemawat and Levinthal 2000; Rivkin 2000; 2001; 
Kauffman, Lobo, and Macready 2000; Fleming and Sorenson 2001).  A mapping from firm decisions to 
payoffs creates a landscape in the space of decisions.  Firms can be conceived of as trying to attain and 
sustain a high spot on such a landscape—a combination of decisions that, together, yield a high payoff.  
Organizational design, we argue, affects firm performance by altering firms’ search behavior on the 
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landscapes they face.  A firm typically gravitates on its landscape toward a “sticking point”—a 
configuration of choices from which it will not change.  Organizational design affects long-term 
performance by two primary channels.  First, it alters the nature of a firm’s sticking points—the number 
of such points and the payoffs associated with them.  Second, it influences the likelihood that a firm will 
actually reach such a stable configuration of choices.  Organizations with the most effective designs, ones 
that balance search and stability, find good points and also stick to those points. 
 
2.  Organizational Design Elements and Their Interdependencies 
A rich heritage of qualitative studies identifies a host of design elements and contextual features that a 
formal model of organizational design might encompass.  In this section, we first explain why we focus 
our modeling effort on five specific considerations.  We then turn to conventional wisdom, drawn from 
the qualitative studies, about how these five interact.  This wisdom, focused on interdependencies 
between an active vertical hierarchy and each of the other considerations, provides a backdrop for the 
results in Section 4.  Finally, we discuss prior formal models of organizationa l design.  In contrast to the 
qualitative studies, only a few prior models have emphasized interdependencies among design elements. 
Common considerations in qualitative studies.  The qualitative literature on organizational design 
is extensive and diverse, encompassing grounded theoretical work, field studies, and numerous syntheses 
(e.g., Mintzberg 1979; Gibson, Ivancevich, and Donnelly 2000).  Nonetheless, the literature is unified in 
what it perceives as the central challenge of organizational design: to divide the tasks of a firm into 
manageable, specialized jobs, yet coordinate the tasks so that the firm reaps the benefits of harmonious 
action.  Implicit in this challenge are two important assumptions.  First, coordination is valuable because 
the tasks of a firm interact with one another; that is, a decision made concerning one task affects the 
efficacy of performing another task one way or another.  Without such interactions, coordination would 
be unnecessary.  Accordingly, the literature on organizational design (Thompson 1967; Galbraith 1973; 
Mintzberg 1979, especially Ch. 7; Nadler and Tushman 1997) has repeatedly returned to the underlying 
pattern of interaction among a firm’s tasks, the first consideration we include in our model.  The second 
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assumption is that the firm’s situation creates a demand for information processing that exceeds the 
deliberative capacity of any individual manager (Simon 1957).  If this were not so, a single über-manager 
could evaluate all of a firm’s alternatives and dictate the best, coordinated course of action.  Hence our 
model incorporates, as a second critical feature, limits on managerial ability. 
How can an organization in which the complexity of decision problems exceeds the cognitive 
capacity of any single decision maker achieve coordinated action?  Below, we focus on three design 
elements that have played a particularly prominent role in the rich discussions found in the qualitative 
literature: vertical hierarchies, incentive systems, and decision decomposition. 1  We emphasize these 
particular elements both because they are ubiquitous in real organizations and because they exemplify the 
three major classes of organizational elements identified by Nadler and Tushman (1997: 67): structural 
links (formal relationships among decision makers separated by structural boundaries), systems and 
processes (formal guides to decision making), and grouping (the aggregation of tasks into work units). 
Vertical hierarchies are perhaps the most common mechanisms employed to coordinate the decisions 
of separate decision makers.  A CEO, for instance, may sit above a set of department heads, review the 
proposals of the departments, and try to integrate them in a way that achieves coordination.  Other formal 
connections across groups exist, e.g., lateral linkages such as liaison positions (Galbraith 1973), but for 
the sake of parsimony, and because it exists in virtually every organization, we focus our modeling effort 
on the vertical hierarchy. 
Coordination can also be enhanced by systems and processes that span group borders.  Designed well, 
such systems and processes can make managers aware of and responsive to what happens beyond their 
own domains.  Nadler and Tushman (1997) identify a rich variety of coordinating systems and processes: 
strategic planning efforts, resource allocation programs, information management systems, and so forth.  
Among these, we choose to model the incentive system, the system that arguably has received the greatest 
attention.  In particular, we explore a system in which managers may be rewarded on the basis of overall 
firm performance rather than on the performance of their individual departments. 
Besides vertical hierarchies and incentive systems, treatises on organizational design consider the way 
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tasks and decisions are grouped together to be “a fundamental means to coordinate work in the 
organization” (Mintzberg 1979: 106).  Theoretical analyses emphasize how interactions among tasks 
influence the way in which decisions should be grouped.  Thompson (1967), for instance, argues that 
decisions should be grouped so that the most intensive interactions are internalized, while Simon (1973) 
stresses that interactions across decision makers should be minimized.  Consequently, groups should be 
formed so that, as nearly as possible, the firm is decomposed (Simon 1962) into independent entities.  
Given the prominence of grouping in the qualitative literature on organizational design, our model 
includes as its fifth feature the notion of decomposition.  That is, modeled firms are able to try to achieve 
coordination by assigning decision rights in a way that places related decisions under a single manager. 
Conventional wisdom about interdependencies.  The qualitative literature not only emphasizes that 
design elements in general have profound effects on each other, but it also identifies some patterns in 
these interdependencies.  Many of these patterns address a critical question about vertical hierarchies: 
under what circumstances and in which combination with other design elements should a firm employ 
senior managers who actively review subordinates’ proposals and retain the right to veto changes?  
Conversely, when should a firm delegate the right to make decisions to subordinate managers?  We 
summarize the received wisdom on these questions as follows: 
· Active vs. passive vertical hierarchy and degree of interaction.  In general, qualitative studies 
have argued that the value of active vertical oversight grows as the degree of interaction among 
decisions increases.  Khandwalla  (1973: 521), for example, notes that “the greater the interface 
between functionally organized departments, the greater is the need for coordinative mechanisms 
such as … a common boss.”  However, the value of active vertical oversight is crucially limited 
by the specter that senior managers may become overloaded by the information flowing up to 
them, causing decision-making to grind to a halt.  As Child (1984: 148) points out: “If top 
executives are overloaded then the effective control they can exercise will be diminished and they 
will tend to sit on decisions which may require speedy attention.”  Decentralized decision-making 
allows a firm to respond more quickly to (changed) local conditions (Mintzberg 1979) and is 
therefore more appropriate in volatile environments (Mintzberg 1981).   
· Active vertical hierarchy and managerial ability.  The presence of an active hierarchy and the 
ability of subordinate managers are usually seen as substitutes.  Child (1984: 71) notes: “The 
greater the competence of subordinates, the less closely they need to be supervised and the less 
often does their work require review.  Therefore as the competence of subordinates rises . . . so it 
becomes feasible to widen spans of control and to reduce levels of management.” 
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· Active vertical hierarchy and firm-wide incentives.  An incentive system that rewards overall firm 
goals, rather than departmental goals, has also been considered a partial substitute for an active, 
coordinating hierarchy.  For instance, Galbraith (1973: 14) points out that “goal setting helps 
coordinate interdependent subtasks and still allows discretion at the local subtask level,” while 
Child (1984: 149) observes that “attention to developing a strong identification with top 
management objectives . . . permits delegated decisions to be made.” 
· Active vertical hierarchy and decision decomposition.  If decisions can be decomposed—parsed 
out to departments—in such a way that few cross-department interactions remain, the value of an 
active vertical hierarchy declines.   “[G]roups that are only minimally interdependent have 
relatively little need for coordination” and therefore do not require active oversight by a hierarchy 
(Nadler and Tushman 1997: 92).  Moreover, decisions that interact should be grouped together as 
much as possible and assigned to a single decision-maker, regardless of the absence or presence 
of a vertical hierarchy (Thompson 1967; Simon 1973). 
Below, we revisit each of these pieces of received wisdom in light of our simulation findings. 
 
Prior formal modeling efforts.  Formal modeling of organizational design has burgeoned in the past 
decade as economists have sought to pry open the “black box” of the firm, yet very few studies have 
considered multiple organizational elements.  As a result, interdependencies among elements have 
received little modeling attention.  In so far as interdependencies have been noted (often as a by-product 
rather than the focus of analysis), results involving vertical hierarchies confirm the conventional wisdom 
outlined above.  For instance, prior models have noted that firm-wide incentives and an active hierarchy 
may serve as substitutes.  “Firms with . . . compensation schemes that reward company-wide performance 
. . . are more likely to have highly decentralized organization structures” (Harris and Raviv 2002: 864).  
Further, in line with conventional wisdom, Aghion and Tirole (1997) observe that the value of an active 
hierarchy increases when decisions are not fully decomposed.  They show that a CEO is more likely to 
intervene when a division manager’s preferred decisions are likely to be very suboptimal for the firm.  
This situation tends to arise “when there are substantial externalities on other divisions, on future 
managers of the division, or on the firm as whole” (p. 14). 
 
3.  A Model of Organizational Design and Search 
Our goal is to test and extend conventional wisdom about interdependencies among organizational 
design elements by probing the roots of such connections.  To do so, we develop a simulation model in 
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which the modeler dictates the underlying pattern of interaction among decisions; a computer generates a 
set of particular decision problems that follow that pattern; and large numbers of modeled firms with 
different organizational characteristics tackle these decision problems.  In this section, we describe each 
of these steps in detail. 
Though a simulation model does not yield “exact,” closed-form solutions as an algebraic approach 
might, the number and nature of the features we feel are important in a model of interdependencies 
(varying degrees of interactions among decisions, limited ability of decisions makers, a vertical hierarchy 
with information flows, changeable incentive systems, and different types of decision decompositions) 
make an algebraic approach infeasible.  Take, for instance, interactions among decisions.  In our model, 
as in reality, pairs of decisions may interact as complements or as substitutes (Porter and Siggelkow 
2002).  As a result, the closed-form analysis of supermodular functions, which has been used to study 
complementary interactions (e.g., Milgrom and Roberts 1990; 1995; Holmström and Milgrom 1994), 
cannot be readily applied.  Moreover, given the limited cognitive abilities of our agents, the long-term 
outcomes of the model can be fully understood only by taking the search process, i.e., the dynamics of the 
model, into account.  Characterizing such paths is straightforward with simulations and extremely 
difficult with analytical models, which tend to focus on equilibrium outcomes and tend to ignore how, 
indeed whether, such equilibria can be reached. 
 
A.  Setting the Pattern of Interaction 
The management team of each modeled firm must make N binary decisions about how to configure 
its activities.  N reflects the fact that a real firm must make numerous decisions.  It must choose, for 
instance, whether to have its own sales force or to sell through third parties, whether to field a broad 
product line or a narrow one, whether to pursue basic R&D or not, etc.  An N-digit string of zeroes and 
ones summarizes all the decisions a firm makes that affect its performance.  We represent this “choice 
configuration” as d = d1d2 … dN with each di either 0 or 1.  Two firms that arrive at the same 
configuration of choices are presumed to achieve the same level of performance even if different 
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organizational structures guided them to this common set of choices.  Put differently, organizational 
arrangements have no direct costs or benefits.  They influence performance only through the operational 
choices they evoke.2 
The efficacy of each decision is affected not only by the choice (0 or 1) made concerning that 
decision, but also by the choices regarding other decisions.  In the model, each decision i makes a 
contribution Ci to overall firm performance.  Ci depends not only on di but also on how other decisions are 
resolved: Ci = Ci(di; other dj’s).  An N x N “influence matrix,” I, records the relationships among 
decisions.  Figure 1 gives some examples of influence matrices for N = 6.  The (i, j)th entry of I is marked 
by an “x” if column-decision j influences the contribution of row-decision i and is blank otherwise.3 
In the simulations reported below, we set influence matrices in two ways.  In some cases, we fully 
specify the matrix by hand (Ghemawat and Levinthal 2000).  We might, for instance, dictate a block-
diagonal matrix of influences as shown in Figure 1C.  With such a pattern of influence, one can compare, 
say, the performance of a firm that allocates decisions 1-3 to one subordinate and decisions 4-6 to the 
other to the performance of a firm that divides responsibility in some other way.  In other simulations, we 
simply specify K, the number of decisions that influence each decision (Kauffman 1993).  The computer 
then randomly determines the identity of the K other decisions that affect each focal decision.  With N = 
6, K = 2, the influence matrix might appear as shown in Figure 1D.  There, the contribution of each 
decision to firm performance is influenced by the resolution of that decision itself and the choices made 
concerning two randomly assigned other decisions.  (Thus, each row contains two off-diagonal x’s.)  
More generally, K can range from 0 to N – 1.  K = 0 implies that decisions are independent.  K = N – 1 
captures a situation in which each decision is influenced by all others.  The parameter K allows us to tune 
the degree of interaction from full independence (Figure 1A) to full interaction (Figure 1B) without 
specifying particular patterns of influence narrowly. 
 
B.  Generating Decision Problems  
Once the pattern of interaction is set, the computer generates a decision problem.  That is, it assigns a 
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payoff to each of the 2N possible configurations of choices.  Recall that the contribution Ci of each 
decision to overall firm value is affected by other decisions: Ci = Ci(di; other dj’s).  For each possible 
realization of di and the relevant other dj’s, a contribution is drawn at random from a uniform U[0, 1] 
distribution.  The overall payoff associated with a configuration is the average over the N contributions: 
P(d) = 
( )
N
s'dother;dC
N
1i
jiiå
=  
This procedure for generating payoff functions—stochastically, but with well-controlled patterns of 
interaction—is adapted from Kauffman’s (1993) NK model, a model originally developed in the context 
of evolutionary biology.  Numerous management scholars have used the procedure in recent years to 
generate payoff functions that can be employed to examine organizational search (Levinthal 1997; 
Gavetti and Levinthal 2000; Ghemawat and Levinthal 2000; Rivkin 2000; Marengo, et al. 2000; 
McKelvey 1999, and references therein).  It is common to interpret such payoff functions in terms of 
high-dimensional landscapes.  Each of the N decisions constitutes a “horizontal” axis in a high-
dimensional space, and each decision offers different options.  Resulting from each combination of 
choices is a payoff for the firm, which is plotted on the vertical axis.  The goal of organizational search is 
to find and occupy a high spot on this landscape, i.e., to select a combination of choices that, together, are 
highly successful (Siggelkow 2001).  Interactions among decisions cause the landscape to become rugged 
and multi-peaked, making the search for a high peak profoundly more difficult (Kauffman 1993; Rivkin 
2000). 
 
C.  Searching the Landscapes 
Having fixed a pattern of interaction, we use the procedure described above to generate many—
typically ten thousand—landscapes with the same underlying pattern of interaction.  Onto each landscape 
(or equivalently, decision problem), we send a set of firms.  Each firm in a set searches for a good 
configuration of choices.  All firms in a particular set start with the same initial configuration of choices.  
Firms in a set differ, however, in their organizational designs and the capabilities of their management 
 11 
teams.  For instance, Firm 1 in a set might have highly capable subordinates while Firm 2 has 
subordinates of very limited ability.   
Decomposition: allocation of decisions.  Each firm has a management team consisting of a CEO, 
subordinate Manager A, and subordinate Manager B.  Manager A has primary responsibility for a subset 
of the N decisions, and Manager B has responsibility for the complementary subset.  We use a string of 
a’s and b’s to designate a particular allocation of decisions.  In a simulation with N = 6, e.g., the 
allocation abbbba would indicate that Manager A has responsibility for decisions 1 and 6 while Manager 
B controls decisions 2-5.  We think of decisions 2-5 as Manager B’s department.  The more that related 
decisions are assigned to a single manager—that is, the more often that x’s in the influence matrix 
correspond to pairs of decisions under one manager—the better an allocation decomposes the decisions. 
Subordinate capability.  Search proceeds in a series of periods.  In each period, each subordinate 
manager reconsiders the configuration of choices in his department.  Specifically, he compares the status 
quo to some number, ALTSUB, alternatives.  Continuing with the N = 6 example mentioned above, 
suppose that ALTSUB = 5 and the current configuration of firm choices is 100111.  This means that the 
current configuration of choices in Manager B’s department is 0011.  He considers five local alternatives 
to 0011.  These include all four of the adjacent alternatives (1011, 0111, 0001, and 0010) and one of the 
six alternatives that involve changing two decisions.  (One of the six is chosen at random.)  ALTSUB 
reflects the cognitive abilities of the subordinate manager.  A manager with a higher level of ALTSUB is 
“smarter”—able to consider more alternatives and able to assess the ramifications of changing more 
choices within his department at once. 
Incentives: assessment of alternatives.  Each manager ranks the ALTSUB alternatives from most 
preferred to least.  In assessing alternatives, he puts primary weight on the performance of his department, 
but he may also consider the effects of his changes beyond his domain.  INCENT, a parameter that ranges 
from 0 to 1, captures the degree to which the subordinate cares about the ramifications of his actions on 
the other department.  INCENT = 0 implies that each manager considers only effects within his 
department; this may reflect, for instance, a firm in which managers are paid strictly on the basis of local 
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business unit profitability.  INCENT = 1 implies that each manager is equally concerned with effects 
outside his department and genuinely wants to maximize firm-wide payoff; this may reflect a firm in 
which divisional officers are rewarded for overall corporate performance.  Continuing with the N = 6 
example: in assessing any alternative d, subordinate Manager B will consider 
P'(d) = {[C2(d) +C3(d) + C4(d) + C5(d)] +  INCENT *[C1(d) + C6(d)]} / 6. 
In evaluating alternatives, each subordinate assumes that choices in the other department will not change.4 
Vertical hierarchy and the ability of the CEO.  Each subordinate considers the ALTSUB alternatives 
and the status quo in his department and sends up to the CEO the P proposals that he most prefers.  A low 
level of P reflects a firm in which managers are expected to, or permitted to, narrow down options a great 
deal before turning to superiors.  A high level of P reflects a firm in which senior managers want to 
review many alternatives themselves.  Note well that the term “CEO” need not be taken literally.  We use 
the term as a shorthand for any vertical coordinating mechanism, such as an executive committee, that 
fulfills functions similar to those outlined below.   
We consider two types of CEOs: rubberstamping and active.  The first type simply approves Manager 
A’s favorite proposal and Manager B’s favorite without review.  A firm with a rubberstamping CEO is 
equivalent to one with no CEO at all.  In such firms, decision making has been completely decentralized 
and subordinate managers have full autonomy over decisions in their departments.  In contrast, the active 
CEO exercises discretion.  From roughly P2 combinations of proposals (P from Manager A * P from 
Manager B), she selects ALTCEO at random, assesses them in light of the interests of the firm as a whole, 
compares them to the status quo, and selects the option that yields the best payoff for the firm.5  ALTCEO 
reflects the cognitive power of the CEO, or more generally, the processing capacity of the coordinating 
unit. 
In the N = 6 example with decision allocation abbbba and current choice configuration 100111, 
suppose that P = 2 and ALTCEO = 2.  Manager B might send up for review the alternatives 1011 and 
0010 for choices 2-5 while Manager A might propose 11 and 10 for decisions 1 and 6.  From the 
possibilities, the CEO might select configurations 110110 and 100110 for comparison to the status quo 
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100111.  Whichever of these three yields the highest payoff for the firm is selected and implemented.  
The new configuration becomes the launching point for further search in the next period.  Subordinates 
and CEOs, thus, differ in the type of knowledge they possess.  Subordinate managers have local 
knowledge that allows them to generate proposals for their departments.  CEOs possess global knowledge 
that enables them to assess the full ramifications of departmental choices on overall firm performance.6 
In sum, firms differ in their organizational arrangements: the grouping of decisions into departments, 
the amount of information conveyed to senior management (P), the degree to which the CEO acts upon 
that information (rubberstamping vs. active), and the incentives that managers have to consider effects 
beyond their domains (INCENT).  Firms also differ in the abilities of their subordinates (ALTSUB) and 
their CEOs (ALTCEO).  Overall, the organization we envision resembles the one examined by Bower’s 
(1970) classic study of the resource allocation process.  Senior management lays out some basic structural 
elements of the firm: the allocation of decision rights and the incentive system, for instance.  Subject to 
those “rules of the game” (Jensen, et al. 1999), lower-level managers select and promote proposals that 
they find attractive.  Senior management then exercises some discretion in selecting among, and 
integrating across, the proposals that “bubble up.” 
 
D.  Sticking Points  
Firms continue to search for many periods.  In many (but not all) cases, firms reach “sticking points” 
after a number of periods.  That is, they reach configurations of choices from which they do not move.  
From a sticking point, there is no alternative configuration of the N choices within the search radius of the 
firm which meets the approval of enough actors within the firm that the alternative can be adopted.  
ALTSUB influences how broad the search radius is.  Organizational arrangements dictate the standards 
that an alternative set of N choices must meet in order to be accepted.  For instance, when the CEO 
exercises discretion, one such standard is that the alternative must yield a higher payoff for the firm as a 
whole than the status quo achieves.  The same standard does not apply when the CEO simply 
rubberstamps proposals and INCENT is low.  Then an alternative that is in the interest of just one 
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department may be implemented. 
In conceptions of organizational search it has been common to think of firms as getting stuck on 
“local peaks” (e.g., Alchian 1950; Levinthal 1997).  A local peak is a configuration of choices for which a 
change in any single choice leads to worse firm performance, even though simultaneous changes in 
several choices may improve firm performance.  In contrast, our more richly modeled firms may well get 
stuck at points other than local peaks (Rivkin and Siggelkow 2002).  The set of sticking points is neither a 
sub- nor a super-set of the set of local peaks.  Suppose, for instance, that a firm with low INCENT and a 
rubberstamping CEO sits atop a local peak.  It is quite possible that a subordinate will discover and 
implement a move that is beneficial for his department but detrimental for the firm, causing the firm to 
descend from the peak.  Thus, a local peak might not be a sticking point.  Similarly, a sticking point need 
not be a local peak.  Consider an example in which a firm is one decision away from a local peak but the 
change required to attain the peak is not in the interest of the manager who controls the relevant decision.  
In such an instance, the manager may never propose the needed change, and a firm may get stuck on the 
“hillside” below a peak.  At such a sticking point, it is also possible that a subordinate will want to make 
some incremental change but the CEO will veto it.  In that case, the firm is stuck even though it is not on 
a local peak of the overall firm’s landscape nor is it on a local peak of the lower-dimensional “subscape” 
defined by departmental choices and payoffs. 
Likewise, sticking points are related to, but different from, the concept of Nash equilibrium outcomes. 
With a rubberstamping CEO, all sticking points are indeed Nash equilibrium outcomes in a game played 
between the two subordinates: at a sticking point, each subordinate is picking the best alternative (for 
him) given the other subordinate’s current decisions.  However, once the CEO becomes active, the sets of 
sticking points and Nash equilibrium outcomes diverge and become neither sub- nor super-sets of each 
other.  At a Nash equilibrium outcome, each player in a game must be taking the best possible action 
given the strategies of the other players.  Unlike players at a Nash outcome, our subordinate managers do 
not anticipate the CEO’s reaction when they propose alternatives.  As a result, they may forego self-
beneficial opportunities.  For instance, they always send up their most preferred proposals, even when 
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those proposals are subsequently rejected by the CEO.  A forward-looking subordinate might opt to make 
a proposal that he prefers less but the CEO will accept.  This failure to consider the CEO’s strategy drives 
a wedge between the sets of sticking points and Nash equilibria when an active hierarchy is in place.  In 
an appendix available on this journal’s web site, we discuss in detail the subtle relationship between 
sticking points and Nash equilibrium outcomes. 
 
4.  Results  
We conducted a comprehensive set of analyses involving each of the five features—vertical 
hierarchy, incentives, decomposition, degree of decision interaction, and managerial ability—and all the 
relations among them.  A few themes recur in the results.  First, certain sets of design elements encourage 
firms to search and evaluate a broad array of options while others lead firms to stabilize and cease their 
search.  Second, firms that perform well typically balance search and stability.  Third, an organizational 
design that promotes search is especially effective when underlying decisions interact with one another 
intensely. 
To illustrate these themes, we focus on a series of interdependencies that involve the vertical 
hierarchy.7  (See Table 1 for a summary.)  Mirroring the presentation of conventional wisdom in Section 
2, we first examine the effects of an active CEO in isolation.  We confirm that an active CEO can slow 
down decision-making, but we also identify another hazard of an active CEO: she acts as a strong force 
for stability and can prematurely channel her firm toward a low sticking point before adequate search is 
undertaken.  This hazard is alleviated, however, when the active CEO is coupled with features that 
encourage broad search—rich information flow, capable subordinates, firm-wide incentives, and 
incomplete decision decomposition.  The stabilizing influence of the active CEO and the search induced 
by other factors create the interdependencies we report here.  Some of the interdependencies confirm 
conventional wisdom, but others bound or challenge it. 
Often in this section, we report that one type of firm achieves a higher level of performance on 
average than another.  In each instance, the difference in mean performance is statistically significant with 
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p < 0.001, assuring that reported differences are not simply chance occurrences caused by the stochastic 
nature of the landscape generation.  We report firm performance as a portion of the highest performance 
attainable on each landscape that was explored. 
Robustness.  We have observed the qualitative patterns described in this section under a far broader 
range of parameter values than reported here, and we are happy to share our simulation software with any 
researcher who wants to probe the robustness of particular results in depth.  That said, our primary goal in 
this paper is not to prove the generality of any single, fine-grained result.  Rather, we aim to illustrate 
particular ways in which the elements of organizational design can relate to one another and to identify 
broad drivers of those relationships across a wide range of results. 
 
A.  Active vs. Passive Vertical Hierarchy and Degree of Interaction 
Before considering the interdependency between an active CEO and other design elements, one must 
examine carefully the effect of an active CEO in isolation.  Recall that the active CEO vets the proposals 
of her subordinates, weighing interactions that local managers ignore and accepting only those changes 
that serve the firm as a whole.  Viewed in this light, the CEO seems to be an unalloyed source of benefit.  
The coordinative value of an active CEO should be particularly high when interactions are pervasive, 
received wisdom tells us.  Conventional wisdom, however, also points to a potential downside of active 
vertical hierarchies: active CEOs may slow down decision-making.  In this subsection, we confirm these 
two pieces of conventional wisdom, but put boundary conditions on both.   
We analyze firms that face decision problems with N = 6.  In each firm, Manager A controls the first 
three decisions and Manager B the last three, i.e., the decision allocation is aaabbb.  Each manager 
considers only one alternative per period (ALTSUB = 1).  We examine all possible degrees of interaction 
among the decisions (K = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5).  The firms we analyze differ in the degree of CEO activity 
(i.e., whether the CEO does anything more than rubberstamp proposals), the ability of the CEO to 
consider multiple options (ALTCEO), and the number of proposals that subordinates submit (P).  
Specifically, we consider the four firms described on the top panel of Table 2.  In Firm 2A, the CEO 
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rubberstamps proposals.  In Firm 2B, each manager sends up his preferred option to a CEO who considers 
one composite alternative per period.  Firm 2C differs from Firm 2B in that each manager sends up two 
proposals.  In Firm 2D, each manager sends up one proposal, but the CEO can consider all new composite 
alternatives (i.e., as many as three) in each period.  We examine the performance of each firm in period 4 
and period 100, representing the short run and the long run.  (We choose periods 4 and 100 simply 
because most firms take considerably more than 4 and less than 100 periods to reach their long-run levels 
of performance.  Qualitatively, the results are not sensitive to the choice of periods 4 and 100.)   
Short-run performance.  The first six rows of Table 2 compare the ability of different firms to 
scramble uphill quickly, for varying levels of K.  The results for K = 0 confirm the conventional wisdom 
that an active but overloaded CEO can be a liability.  Firm 2A with its rubberstamping CEO and 
decentralized decision-making performs as well as or better than any of the firms with active CEOs.  An 
active CEO undermines performance because she is overwhelmed with proposals and becomes a 
bottleneck, standing between good proposals from the departments and implementation of those 
proposals.  In Firm 2B, for instance, the CEO has up to three composite alternatives to evaluate each 
period, but can assess only one.  Overloaded, she may ignore good proposals that are sent to her by the 
subordinates.  As one would expect, the effect is exacerbated when the number of proposals rises (Firm 
2C) and mitigated when the CEO can process more options per period (Firm 2D). 
As interactions across departmental boundaries proliferate, the active CEO changes from liability to 
asset.  At high K, Firm 2B fares better than Firm 2A in period 4.  On rugged landscapes, the benefits of a 
CEO who understands the interaction structure outweigh the danger of CEO-overload.  Put differently, 
when K is high, local managers do not have a good idea of what proposals are valuable for the firm as a 
whole.  Hence, even if the CEO does not get around to looking at the proposal most preferred by a 
manager, not much harm is done.  This finding puts a boundary condition on the conventional wisdom 
about overloaded CEOs: if interactions across departments are dense enough, an active CEO is beneficial 
in the short run despite the hazard that she may delay acceptance of good proposals.   
Long-run performance.  Intuition suggests that the CEO-overload problem should fade in the long-run.  
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If a good proposal is sent up enough times, at some point the CEO will consider it, accept it, and cease to be 
a bottleneck. This is particularly salient on a smooth landscape (i.e., K = 0).  Given enough time, every 
firm—even one with a very overloaded CEO—should reach the global peak of such a landscape.  In the 
following results, we confirm this intuition, but identify another, persistent drawback of an active CEO. 
The middle panel of Table 2 reports the performance of each firm in period 100.  When K = 0, we 
expect and find that all firms reach the global peak in the long run.  For high values of K, however, Firm 
2A, which has a rubberstamping CEO, performs better than Firm 2B, which has an active CEO.  Why is 
the active CEO a detriment even in the long run for Firm 2B?  Firms with active CEOs never move 
downhill on a landscape; the CEO vetoes such a maneuver.  As a result, these firms quickly reach sticking 
points before considering a wide range of alternatives.  They run the risk of excessive stability.  In 
contrast, firms with rubberstamping CEOs will sometimes implement alternatives that cause overall 
performance to decline temporarily.  This promotes a wider search of possibilities and can lead, in the 
long run, to higher performance.  The final two rows of Table 2 support this interpretation for the case of 
K = 5.  Firm 2B perceives far more sticking points than Firm 2A and is much more likely to get stranded 
on a low sticking point, i.e., a poor compromise among the subordinates and the CEO.  In sum, Firm 2B 
has more stability and undertakes less search than is optimal when interactions are pervasive. 
Employing a smarter CEO, as Firm 2D does, does not alleviate the problem that an active CEO 
causes when K is high; an ability at the top of the organization to assess more alternatives does not help if 
too few alternatives are being proposed.  On the other hand, it is helpful to insist on a greater flow of 
information from subordinates to the CEO, as Firm 2C does.  With more proposals (P) coming in, the 
danger of premature lock-in diminishes and the benefits of an active CEO—especially her ability to keep 
subordinates from acting in ways that undermine overall performance—reassert themselves.  The search 
promoted by higher P productively balances the stability provided by the CEO.   
The active CEO, thus, has quite different drawbacks in the short-run and the long-run.  In the short-
run, especially if interactions are sparse, the CEO can pose a bottleneck, blocking the rapid progress that a 
decentralized firm would enjoy.  The problem is exacerbated by a greater flow of information and 
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alleviated by the hiring of a smarter CEO.  In the long-run, an active CEO can funnel a firm prematurely 
to a mediocre sticking point.  The problem is alleviated by a greater flow of information, but not by an 
increase in the CEO’s processing power.  The risk of premature lock-in is especially acute when 
interactions are pervasive.  Interactions make the underlying landscape rugged and multipeaked, which 
provides a “natural” source of stability.  It is in this setting that the additional stability provided by an 
active, low-P CEO can harm firm performance.  Thus, we pinpoint a boundary condition on the 
conventional wisdom that active hierarchies are more valuable when interactions are pervasive: this 
appears to be true only if the CEO receives a rich flow of information.  If interactions are pervasive and 
the CEO gets little information, she serves the firm better by rubberstamping subordinates’ proposals than 
by actively exercising oversight. 
The long-run results in Table 2 illustrate a general pattern: as interactions among decisions become 
more pervasive, design elements that encourage broad search grow more important.  Comparing Firms 2B 
and 2C, for instance, we see that the incremental benefit of a richer flow of information, which promotes 
more search, rises steadily from 0.000 when K = 0 to +0.073 when K = 5.   
The findings in this section, taken as a whole, also suggest that very different vertical hierarchies may 
be suitable for volatile and stable environments.  In volatile settings, firms essentially face a series of 
short-run problems.  Attaining decent results quickly requires either a passive CEO who lets subordinates 
make final choices (when K is low) or a very smart CEO who acts on the basis of limited information 
(when K is high).  In stable settings, firms can focus on long-run performance, which is best delivered by 
an active, not-necessarily-brilliant CEO who receives and reviews numerous proposals.  This conclusion 
is reminiscent of Burns and Stalker’s (1961) findings on organic and mechanistic organizations and 
Brown and Eisenhardt’s (1997) observations of successful organizational structures in highly dynamic 
environments.  This speculative interpretation deserves further research. 
 
B.  Active Vertical Hierarchy and Managerial Ability 
In the last subsection, we identified the stabilizing effect of the active CEO in the long run, noted that 
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the effect may be harmful when interactions provide natural stability, and illustrated how the search 
induced by richer information flow may counterbalance the CEO’s stability.  In the next three 
subsections, we examine how other design elements and contextual features may also provide balance.  
We start by analyzing the effects of “smart” subordinates who can consider a wide array of options within 
the departments.  We show that the search undertaken by such subordinates can balance the stability of an 
active CEO, making capable subordinates and active CEOs complementary in our model.  This runs 
contrary to conventional wisdom, for reasons we explain below. 
To analyze the interdependency between hierarchy and subordinate ability, we engage in simulations 
with the same parameter settings as in the previous subsection, but vary the number of alternatives that 
each manager is able to evaluate in each period (ALTSUB).  The left, middle and right panels of Table 3 
show performance in period 100 for firms with subordinates who are able to evaluate one, four, and seven 
alternatives per period, respectively.  All subordinates pursue departmental performance (INCENT = 0).8   
The first striking result shown in Table 3 is that a firm can undermine its long-run performance by 
hiring smarter managers, especially when decisions interact richly and the CEO rubberstamps decisions.  
A comparison of the three firms with rubberstamping CEOs—Firms 3A, 3E, and 3I—makes this clear.  
For K = 5, for instance, performance declines steadily as ALTSUB rises from 1 to 4 to 7.  For all values of 
K > 0, an increase in ALTSUB from 4 to 7 leads to worse performance.  Why can smarter managers 
undermine long-run performance?  The answer lies in the problem that smart subordinates create for each 
other when their domains influence one another.  A smart subordinate searches broadly and undertakes 
far-reaching changes to improve the performance of his department.  In doing so, however, he undermines 
the improvement efforts that the other, equally smart subordinate is making.  Hence a pair of smart 
subordinates can dance about—each making radical changes that seem like uphill movements from his 
own perspective but that deform the landscape as the other sees it.  The higher is ALTSUB, the graver is 
the danger of this on-going dance.  Reflecting this, the portion of firms that still wander after period 80 
rises from 3.9% for Firm 3A to 60.8% for Firm 3I, and the number of sticking points falls from 3.9 to 1.0. 
The broad search pursued by smart subordinates may be harnessed to good effect if an active, 
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stabilizing CEO is present.  Accordingly, we see performance rise with ALTSUB, or at least fail to fall 
dramatically as ALTSUB increases, when a CEO reviews and ratifies proposals.  For any given level of 
ALTSUB, the portion of firms wandering after period 80 falls dramatically and the number of sticking 
points rises once an active CEO is in place.  Moreover, the performance benefit of an active CEO relative 
to one who rubberstamps proposals, a figure reported in the bottom portion of Table 3, grows with 
ALTSUB.  For instance, for a CEO with P = 1 and ALTCEO = 1, the benefit increases from –0.017 to 
+0.086 as ALTSUB rises from 1 to 7. 
An active hierarchy and capable subordinates are complements in our model; that is, the benefit of 
having an active CEO rises with ALTSUB.  In contrast, received wisdom holds that the two are substitutes: 
senior management oversight is less necessary when subordinates are highly capable.  The difference 
stems from distinct perspectives on the role of senior management.  To simplify, the conventional view 
holds that senior managers are responsible for handling exceptions thrown up by the outside world: “the 
hierarchy of authority is employed on an exception basis.  That is, the new situation, for which there is no 
preplanned response, is referred upward in the hierarchy to permit the creation of a new response” 
(Galbraith 1973: 11).  Senior managers are presumed to have the expertise and experience to create new 
responses and to solve unusually difficult problems (Garicano 2000).  The more capable are subordinates, 
the rarer are such exceptions and the less necessary is an active hierarchy.  In contrast, we envision senior 
managers as the integrators and ratifiers of subordinates’ proposals for change.  An increase in the 
potential scope of subordinate proposals makes senior management all the more necessary, especially 
when decisions interact with one another.  We interpret our findings as a boundary condition on 
conventional wisdom.  Where senior managers are repositories of expertise that enable a firm to handle 
surprising circumstances, an active hierarchy and capable subordinates are likely to be substitutes.  But 
where senior managers serve to check and integrate internal proposals, the two may be complements.  
Smart managers may offset any excess stability of the active hierarchy while the hierarchy stabilizes the 
radical search undertaken by smart managers.9 
So far, we have presented smarter managers as a source of broader search.  There is, however, a way 
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in which smarter managers can prevent wide search and exacerbate the potential for excessive stability.  
Note in Table 3 that performance sometimes declines with higher ALTSUB even for a firm with an active 
CEO; for instance, the performance of Firm 3K, with ALTSUB = 7, is modestly lower than that of Firm 
3C, with ALTSUB = 1 for all K > 0.  Since active CEOs prevent excessive wandering, the reason for the 
performance difference in such cases can not be a failure to achieve stability.  Rather, the difference is 
driven by restricted search.  In Firm 3C, each subordinate is essentially forced to send up two random 
proposals every period.  In Firm 3K, in contrast, each subordinate ranks seven alternatives and sends up 
his two most preferred.  As a result, the heterogeneity of proposals received by the CEO is larger in Firm 
3C than in Firm 3K, leading Firm 3C to experience wider search.  When a subordinate is so smart that the 
number of alternatives he considers is much greater than the number of proposals he must reveal, the pre-
screening he performs can restrict search.  In essence, the subordinate is able to hide options he dislikes 
behind the tall stack of alternatives he has considered.  This dynamic plays a part in the next subsection. 
 
C.  Active Vertical Hierarchy and Firm-wide Incentives 
Conventional wisdom suggests an interdependency between incentive systems that stress firm-wide 
outcomes and the presence of an active CEO: firm-wide incentives may reduce or even eliminate the need 
for an active CEO.  Bounding this wisdom, we find situations in which firm-wide incentives can induce 
broad search, thereby making the stability of an active CEO more valuable.   
In all previous simulations, each subordinate manager was under a parochial incentive system, 
evaluating alternatives only from the perspective of his individual department.  Here we conduct 
simulations that have the same parameter settings as those in the previous subsection except that the value 
of INCENT is set to 1.  Thus, in evaluating alternatives, each subordinate manager takes into account the 
full effect of his actions on the firm as a whole.  Table 4, which reports the results, has precisely the same 
structure as Table 3. 
The key results are most easily seen by comparing the lines labeled “Benefit of active CEO” in Tables 
3 and 4.  Especially for firms with ALTSUB = 4 or 7, the benefit of having an active CEO increases as 
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INCENT rises from 0 to 1.  For example, for Firm 3J, with INCENT = 0, the benefit of having an active 
CEO is +0.086, while for Firm 4J, with INCENT = 1, the benefit is +0.211.  Accordingly, the active CEO 
and firm-wide incentives complement one another.  This result arises because firm-wide incentives within 
an active vertical hierarchy promote search that balances the stability provided by the active CEO.  Why 
do firm-wide incentives promote search in the presence of an active CEO?  Recall that the active CEO 
rejects alternatives that are detrimental to the firm as a whole.  When incentives are parochial, the CEO 
often receives proposals that do not benefit the firm.  She rejects these proposal out of hand so the 
proposals do not lead to effective exploration of the landscape.  In contrast, when subordinates face firm-
wide incentives, the CEO receives far more proposals that are acceptable to her, and much more 
movement ensues.  In line with this intuition, we see that firms with an active CEO experience fewer 
sticking points when INCENT = 1 than when INCENT = 0.   
In the absence of an active CEO, however, firm-wide incentives can lead to less search than parochial 
incentives, since subordinates have to find alternatives that are beneficial for the firm as a whole, rather 
than only for their departments.  This effect is suggested by the larger number of the sticking points 
perceived by the rubberstamping firms in Table 4 versus those in Table 3. 
Our finding that an active hierarchy is a complement to firm-wide incentives runs contrary to 
conventional wisdom.  The intuition behind the conventional wisdom is straightforward: if subordinates 
have the interests of the overall firm at heart, why does one need oversight?  Our answer is that firm-wide 
incentives can coordinate the intentions of subordinates, but they do not necessarily coordinate the actions 
of subordinates when decisions interact.  Capable subordinates can engage in aggressive, well-intentioned 
search that results in mutually destructive “improvement.”  This possibility is most vividly illustrated by 
Firms 3I and 4I, which have highly capable managers and rubberstamping CEOs.  Firm-wide incentives 
cause a precipitous drop in performance for K > 0, as subordinates engage in search unchecked by an 
active CEO.  In contrast, firm-wide incentives improve performance when an active CEO is present.  The 
active hierarchy provides a device to coordinate actual moves, not just motives. 
If firm-wide incentives encourage broad search in firms with active CEOs, one might expect the 
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marginal benefit of such incentives to rise as interactions among decisions become pervasive, which 
introduces “natural” stability.  A comparison of Tables 3 and 4 confirms this: for firms with active CEOs, 
the marginal benefit of firm-wide incentives increases as K rises from 0 to 2, then levels off.  For Firms 3J 
and 4J, for instance, the marginal benefit rises from 0.000 for K = 0 to +0.021 for K = 1 to +0.035 for K = 
2, then stabilizes for higher K. 
 
D.  Active Vertical Hierarchy and Decision Decomposition 
We turn finally to the interdependency between an active CEO and the decomposition of decisions 
into departments.  As discussed in Section 2, a consensus exists in the qualitative literature on 
organizational design that firms should, as much as possible, assign decisions that influence one another 
to the same manager.  This manager is able to “internalize” the interactions among decisions and find the 
department’s choice configuration that is best for the firm.  Moreover, conventional wisdom points out 
that when decisions are fully decomposed—grouped such that all interactions are internalized—an active 
vertical hierarchy might be unnecessary.  
To study the interdependency between decision decomposition and the active CEO, we examine a 
series of simulations in which the influence matrix is block-diagonal as shown in Figure 1C.  That is, 
firms face decision problems in which N = 6, and all interactions are among decisions 1–3 and decisions 
4–6.  While the particular profit contributions change from run to run, this pattern of interaction stays the 
same.  Incentives are parochial (INCENT = 0), and each manager considers one local alternative to his 
current configuration of choices (ALTSUB = 1).  Firms differ in the manner in which decisions are 
allocated to subordinates and whether their CEOs exercise active discretion (see Table 5).  Firms 5A and 
5B have the decision allocation aaabbb, which completely decomposes the firm into two independent 
parts, while Firms 5C and 5D have decision allocation aabbba, which leaves interactions between the 
departments.  Firms 5A and 5C have rubberstamping CEOs, whereas Firms 5B and 5D have active CEOs. 
The simulation results are in line with the second aspect of conventional wisdom noted above: if 
decisions are completely decomposed, the performance benefit of an active CEO is nil (performance of 
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Firm 5A = performance of Firm 5B).  Suggested improvements that are sent up benefit the proposing 
department and—because of the complete decomposition—have no effect on the other department.  
Moreover, the most preferred departmental improvements are also the most beneficial for the firm as a 
whole.  As a result, the CEO always accepts preferred proposals of each subordinate and, consequently, 
acts much like a rubberstamper.  Accordingly, the performance of Firm 5B is indistinguishable from that 
of Firm 5A.  In contrast, when interactions remain across the departments, the CEO provides valuable 
stability (performance of Firm 5D >> performance of Firm 5C).  Firm 5C, with a rubberstamping CEO, 
fails to come to a sticking point on 22.1% of the landscapes.  In contrast, Firm 5D, with an active, 
stabilizing CEO, always comes to a steady configuration of decisions. 
Intriguingly, the best performance in Table 5 is attained by Firm 5D, which has an active, well-
informed CEO and “unnecessary” overlap between departments.  This result contradicts one of the most 
common pieces of received wisdom, that decisions should be allocated to minimize cross-department 
interactions.  The cause of Firm 5D’s superior performance is again a helpful balance of search and 
stability: the overlap across departments generates wide search, as each subordinate proposes—and is 
sometimes allowed to enact—options that change conditions in the other department, prompting new 
search in that department.  The active CEO ensures that the firm eventually stabilizes around any great 
option that the wide search produces.  Put differently, the incomplete decomposition generates search that 
the active CEO can take advantage of.  Thus we see imperfect decomposition and an active CEO as 
complements, the search generated by one working well in concert with the stability generated by the 
other.10  In sum, we place an important boundary condition on the conventional wisdom that firms should 
strive for complete decomposition.  “Unnecessary” overlap between departments can induce subordinates 
to make creative proposals that pry firms off of low sticking points.  The ensuing search, coupled with an 
active, stabilizing CEO, can produce superior performance. 
 
5.  Discussion 
The existence of interdependencies among elements of organizational design has become a bedrock 
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proposition in the literature on organizations, yet relatively little is known about the underlying forces that 
create these interdependencies.  Using a simulation model of organizational design and search, we 
identify one such force: interdependencies arise because design elements influence both how broadly a 
firm searches its environment to discover good sets of coordinated choices and whether the firm is able to 
stabilize around those sets once they are discovered.  The adoption of an element that encourages broad 
search typically raises the marginal benefit of other elements that provide offsetting stability.  This duality 
between search and stability has played a central role in substantial prior research—on the productivity 
dilemma (Abernathy 1978), static and dynamic efficiency (Ghemawat and Ricart i Costa 1993), 
exploration and exploitation (March 1991), and the ambidextrous organization (Tushman and O'Reilly 
1996), for instance.  We add to these precedents in three ways. 
First, in the context of a formal model of search, we associate search and stability with specific 
combinations of design elements (see Figure 2).  The designers of an organization can promote stability 
by employing an active CEO, who rejects proposals that make the firm as a whole worse off, or by 
decomposing decisions such that no cross-departmental interactions remain.  Designers can broaden 
search by increasing the number of proposals sent to the CEO.  The effects of firm-wide incentive 
systems and subordinates who are able to evaluate many alternatives are more subtle: they depend on the 
degree of discretion the CEO exercises.  When the CEO is active and subordinates are allowed to send 
only few proposals, smarter subordinates can curtail search since they are more able to hide parochially 
distasteful alternatives from the CEO.  In contrast, when the CEO rubberstamps proposals, firms with 
smarter subordinates engage in broader search since managers are given free rein.  Firm-wide incentives 
can broaden search when the CEO is active by reducing the proportion of proposals that are rejected 
outright by the CEO, but they tend to restrict search when the CEO is passive since each subordinate then 
has to find solutions that benefit the firm as a whole, not his department alone. 
Our second contribution is to emphasize the need for an organization to strike a balance between 
search and stability.  While much of the prior literature highlights the tension between the two, we focus 
on ways in which they can work together.  We find, for instance, that it can be useful to couple an active, 
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stabilizing CEO with a rich vertical flow of information that promotes search (Section 4.A).  Similarly, 
the broad search generated by smarter managers (4.B), by firm-wide incentives (4.C), or by an incomplete 
decision decomposition (4.D) can be harnessed only if it is balanced by the stability of an active CEO.  
Our results thus pinpoint the conditions that make an active vertical hierarchy especially valuable: very 
capable subordinates, incentives that stress firm-wide outcomes, and decision interactions across 
departments.  Our findings that capable subordinates and firm-wide incentives complement an active 
hierarchy depart from conventional wisdom because we view top-level managers as integrators, not as 
exception handlers.  Smart managers, even if they have the firm’s interest at heart, may still require 
coordination.  Similarly, firm-wide incentives, while aligning intentions, may still fail to align actions.   
Third, we show how the underlying pattern of interaction among decisions affects the appropriate 
balance between search and stability.  The greater is the degree of interaction among decisions, the more 
rugged are the landscapes that firms face.  This ruggedness provides built-in stability.  A firm can 
productively counter this stability by shifting its organizational arrangements in favor of search.  Hence, 
we see a need for a rubberstamping CEO or a rich vertical flow of information when interactions are 
pervasive and subordinates do not evaluate many alternatives (4.A).  Similarly, we find that the marginal 
benefits of search-promoting firm-wide incentives increase with the density of interactions (4.C). 
The three contributions we just identified suggest a set of empirical propositions: 
Hypothesis 1:  Both an active CEO and decision decomposition encourage stability in firm choices, 
ceteris paribus.  A rich vertical flow of information, firm-wide incentives in the presence of an active 
CEO, and more capable subordinates in the absence of an active CEO promote wide search. 
 
Hypothesis 2:  Organizations that couple design elements that foster search with elements that promote 
stability will be more successful than those that rely exclusively on one set of elements or the other. 
 
Hypothesis 3:  Successful organizations in environments with pervasive interactions among decisions will 
rely more heavily on design elements that promote search than do successful organizations in 
environments with less pervasive interactions. 
 
 
Our findings both support and extend the extensive literature on organizational configurations (e.g., 
Miles and Snow 1978; Mintzberg 1979; Doty, Glick, and Huber 1993).  This line of work contends that 
only a few internally consistent configurations of organizational design elements exist.  This may be true 
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in part because of the interdependencies generated by the need to balance search and stability.  In this 
paper, we have envisioned firms with fixed organizational designs that struggle to find effective 
combinations of operational choices.  One can imagine, however, that in the long term, firms are also 
engaged in a search for good organizational designs.  That is, they struggle on a higher-order landscape 
whose horizontal dimensions are elements of organizational design.  Interdependencies among 
organizational design elements may give rise to multiple local peaks on this landscape, with each peak 
corresponding to an organizational configuration.  A natural extension of the present paper is to allow 
modeled firms to tweak their internal structures—that is, explore the landscape of organizational 
elements—and examine whether firms gravitate toward effective organizational designs. 
Though the interdependencies we identify may underpin configurations, our results call into question 
the recommendation that firms pursue pure “consistent” configurations.  Some of the configuration 
literature suggests that a firm should be fully geared toward search or toward stability (e.g., Miles and 
Snow’s (1978) prospectors and defenders).  In contrast, our results highlight the need to balance both 
attributes in each organization.  The difference between our findings and the prior emphasis on pure 
configurations may arise for three reasons.  First, scholars of configuration typically acknowledge that 
pure configurations are simply ideal types, useful for exposition, yet hybrids may arise in reality and have 
higher performance because of “the need to respond to more than one valid force at the same time” 
(Mintzberg 1979: 474). 
Second, while we emphasize the need to balance search and stability, we also stress that contextual 
variables affect the nature of that balance.  Hypothesis 3, for instance, contends that an increase in 
underlying interactions should tilt the balance toward search.  Another critical contextual feature that we 
have purposely suppressed in this paper is environmental change.  A distinguished line of research 
emphasizes that organizations design themselves in part to cope with environmental change (Burns and 
Stalker 1961; Chandler 1962; Lawrence and Lorsch 1967).  A valuable extension of this paper would 
place our simulated firms on fluctuating landscapes and examine what kinds of organizational designs 
deal well with external turbulence.  Different types of environmental change might necessitate different 
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combinations of search and stability.  Looking at a cross-section of contexts, one might very well see a 
pattern configuration scholars would predict—that numerous organizational elements associated with 
search are adopted in some settings and many elements associated with stability are adopted in others—
even though any single organization requires a balance between search and stability, as we contend. 
Third, inter-firm rivalry may push firms toward pure configurations.  The present paper purposely 
ignores direct competition between firms, in order to keep the analysis relatively simple.  In reality, firms 
that make overly similar operational choices after adopting the same organizational design may be 
indistinguishable to customers, resulting in mutually destructive competition.  A desire to create 
distinctions between firms may lead firms in an industry to spread out in the space of possible designs—
perhaps with some very stable organizations and others that emphasize search.  Our model could easily be 
extended to explore this possibility. 
More broadly, this possibility and our paper as a whole illustrate a general theme that emerges from 
agent-based simulations of organizations, which have become popular in management science recently 
(e.g., Carley and Lin 1997; Levinthal 1997; Anderson, et al. 1999; McKelvey 1999): connections at one 
level of analysis drive connections at other levels.  In the present paper, the underlying interactions among 
a firm’s decisions shape interdependencies among organizational design elements.  Interdependencies 
among design elements set the stage for organizational configurations, which in turn may mold the 
interplay among competing firms.  Such layered connectivity is one of the features that make 
organizations fascinating yet challenging to study. 
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1 We focus on formal design elements rather than informal elements such as casual communication systems 
(Mintzberg 1979) or corporate culture (Camerer and Vepsalainen 1988).  We do so not because informal elements 
are unimportant or lack interesting interdependencies, but rather for other reasons.  The formal elements alone are 
more than sufficient to fuel a complex analysis, as the rest of the paper shows.  Moreover, the formal elements can 
be modeled more precisely than the informal.  Precise modeling of each individual element is especially important if 
one wants, as we do, to examine the interdependencies among them.  That said, we consider the analysis of informal 
elements of organizational design to be an important topic for future research. 
2 The model also does not incorporate interplay among firms.  That is, a firm’s payoff from a configuration is 
independent of other firms’ configurations. 
3 Our influence matrix is closely related to the design and task structure matrices pioneered by Steward (1981), 
Eppinger et al. (1994), and Baldwin and Clark (2000) in the context of product design. 
4 Our formulation requires that managers know the total contribution of each department or, equivalent, the 
performance of the entire firm and the total contribution of one department.  Experts in accounting and performance 
measurement have developed sophisticated techniques to isolate the contributions of individual divisions, product 
lines, and functional depart ments (e.g., Kaplan and Atkinson 1998).  These techniques may, of course, err in their 
measurements of contributions.  In related work, we are exploring what happens when managers in firms with 
various organizational designs misperceive performance. 
5 Each subordinate sends up P options, which may or may not include the departmental status quo.  The CEO always 
considers the departmental status quo as an option, even if the subordinate does not submit it.  Hence the CEO may 
have as many as (P + 1)2 – 1 new combinations at her disposal (if neither manager submits the status quo as one of 
his proposals) or as few as P2 – 1 (if both managers submit the status quo as one of their proposals). 
6 For parsimony, our formulation suppresses a number of considerations worthy of future research.  For example, 
our managers have no cognitive representations (Gavetti and Levinthal 2000), our CEO has no agenda of her own, 
our firms implement plans without error (Siggelkow 2002), and our subordinate managers do not communicate 
laterally.  Note, however, that our CEO is functionally equivalent to a form of lateral communication in which 
subordinates rank departmental options, convene in a conference room, consider composite alternatives, and pick the 
composite that is best for the firm.  P then reflects the number of options that subordinates bring to the conference 
room, and ALTCEO reflects the limited time that managers can afford to spend there. 
7 Interdependencies also exist that do not involve the vertical hierarchy, but the interdependencies we examine here 
are sufficient to illustrate our general themes.  Full results that show other interdependencies are available from the 
authors. 
8 This subsection and the following two focus on interdependencies as exhibited in long-run performance.  Short-run 
results, available from the authors, display interdependencies that are qualitatively similar. 
9 Smart managers and an active hierarchy are complements in the sense of Milgrom and Roberts (1990): the 
adoption of one increases the benefit of adopting the other.  To an actual manager in such a firm, however, the two 
countervailing items may not feel particularly consistent.  A smart manager may be frustrated, for instance, by what 
he perceives as the meddling of an active CEO.  This may even undermine the subordinate’s motivation to search 
for better choices, a consideration we do not model here. 
10 The bottom of Table 5 supports this interpretation.  Compared to the completely decomposed Firm 5B, Firm 5D 
gets stuck on fewer and higher points; departmental overlap shakes Firm 5D off of low sticking points and 
encourages it to explore possibilities more widely.  Compared to Firm 5C, which has a rubberstamping CEO, Firm 
5D is unlikely to wander forever; it stabilizes around its high sticking points.  While Firm 5B has only the advantage 
of stability and Firm 5C has only the advantage of search, Firm 5D enjoys both.   
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TABLE 1–SUMMARY OF RESULTS 
 Conventional wisdom Results 
Active vs. passive 
vertical hierarchy and 
degree of interaction 
· An active vertical hierarchy can 
be overloaded, which slows 
down decision-making. 
· An active vertical hierarchy is 
more valuable when decisions 
interact richly. 
· Confirmed when interactions are sparse.  When interactions are dense, 
however, the coordinating benefit of the hierarchy outweighs the cost of 
overloading.  
· Confirmed for short-run performance.  However, an active hierarchy can 
undermine long-term performance when interactions are dense and 
information flow is limited, by rapidly locking the firm into a poor set of 
decisions. 
Active vertical 
hierarchy and 
managerial ability 
· An active hierarchy is less 
valuable when subordinates are 
highly capable. 
· An active hierarchy is more valuable when subordinates are highly 
capable and interactions are dense.  An active hierarchy is required to 
stabilize excessive search of smart managers. 
Active vertical 
hierarchy and firm-
wide incentives 
· An active hierarchy is less 
valuable when subordinates are 
rewarded for firm-wide 
performance. 
· An active hierarchy is more valuable when subordinates are rewarded for 
firm-level performance, especially when subordinates are highly capable.  
Firm-wide incentives alone may not achieve stability, since they 
coordinate only intentions, not actions.  The active hierarchy provides 
necessary stability. 
Active vertical 
hierarchy and 
decision 
decomposition 
· An active hierarchy is less 
valuable when decisions can be 
decomposed so that few cross-
department interactions remain. 
· Decisions should be allotted to 
subordinates so that cross-
department interactions are 
minimized. 
· Confirmed.  When decisions are completely decomposed, there is no 
benefit of coordination across departments, so the value of hierarchy is 
zero. 
 
· Confirmed for a rubberstamping vertical hierarchy.  With an active 
hierarchy, however, leaving “unnecessary” interactions between 
departments can yield higher performance.  Incomplete decomposition 
creates additional search that can be exploited by an active, stabilizing 
hierarchy. 
 
 
TABLE 2—EFFECT OF ACTIVE VS. RUBBERSTAMPING CEO ON PERFORMANCE  
Firm 2A 2B 2C 2D 
ALTCEO R 1 1 3 
P - 1 2 1 
  
  Performance in period 4 
K = 0 0.951 0.939 0.886 0.950 
K = 1 0.884 0.893 0.857 0.905 
K = 2 0.842 0.862 0.838 0.877 
K = 3 0.814 0.846 0.827 0.861 
K = 4 0.797 0.835 0.825 0.850 
K = 5 0.780 0.828 0.822 0.842 
  
 Performance in period 100 
K = 0 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
K = 1 0.943 0.952 0.987 0.954 
K = 2 0.910 0.918 0.970 0.921 
K = 3 0.894 0.897 0.956 0.900 
K = 4 0.886 0.880 0.945 0.884 
K = 5 0.882 0.865 0.938 0.869 
  
For K = 5:  
Benefit of active CEO in period 100 - -0.017* 0.056* -0.013* 
Portion of time that firm is still 
wandering after period 80 3.9% 0.0% 2.1% 0.0% 
Number of sticking points 3.9 13.0 4.1 13.0 
Average height of sticking points 0.869 0.827 0.918 0.827 
N = 6, aaabbb, INCENT = 0, ALTSUB = 1.  R indicates rubberstamping CEO.  Performance is an 
average over 10,000 landscapes.  Sticking point results are an average over 500 landscapes.  
Differences denoted by * are significant with p < 0.001. 
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TABLE 3—INTERDEPENDENCY BETWEEN ACTIVE CEO AND SUBORDINATE CAPABILITY WITH INCENT = 0 
Firm 3A 3B 3C 3D 3E 3F 3G 3H 3I 3J 3K 3L 
ALTCEO R 1 1 3 R 1 1 3 R 1 1 3 
P - 1 2 1 - 1 2 1 - 1 2 1 
ALTSUB 1 1 1 1 4 4 4 4 7 7 7 7 
             Performance in period 100 for:             
K = 0 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
K = 1 0.943 0.952 0.987 0.954 0.955 0.964 0.981 0.967 0.951 0.960 0.979 0.964 
K = 2 0.910 0.918 0.970 0.921 0.921 0.938 0.965 0.943 0.897 0.929 0.962 0.938 
K = 3 0.894 0.897 0.956 0.900 0.900 0.920 0.953 0.926 0.854 0.912 0.948 0.922 
K = 4 0.886 0.880 0.945 0.884 0.884 0.909 0.943 0.917 0.825 0.900 0.937 0.915 
K = 5 0.882 0.865 0.938 0.869 0.870 0.900 0.936 0.910 0.810 0.896 0.931 0.912 
             For K = 5:             
Benefit of active CEO - -0.017* 0.056* -0.013* - 0.030* 0.066* 0.040* - 0.086* 0.121* 0.102* 
Portion of time that firm is still 
wandering after period 80 3.9% 0.0% 2.1% 0.0% 36.7% 0.0% 0.3% 0.0% 60.8% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Number of sticking points 3.9 13.0 4.1 13.0 1.2 7.4 2.9 7.4 1.0 9.2 5.1 9.2 
Average height of sticking points 0.869 0.827 0.918 0.827 0.928 0.873 0.939 0.873 0.936 0.852 0.898 0.852 
N = 6, aaabbb, INCENT = 0.  R indicates rubberstamping CEO.  Performance for each level of K is an average over 10,000 landscapes.  Sticking point results are an average over 500 landscapes.    
Differences denoted by * are significant with p < 0.001. 
 
TABLE 4—INTERDEPENDENCY BETWEEN ACTIVE CEO AND SUBORDINATE CAPABILITY WITH INCENT = 1 
Firm 4A 4B 4C 4D 4E 4F 4G 4H 4I 4J 4K 4L 
ALTCEO R 1 1 3 R 1 1 3 R 1 1 3 
P - 1 2 1 - 1 2 1 - 1 2 1 
ALTSUB 1 1 1 1 4 4 4 4 7 7 7 7 
             Performance in period 100 for:             
K = 0 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
K = 1 0.971 0.970 0.987 0.972 0.973 0.982 0.987 0.986 0.941 0.981 0.987 0.987 
K = 2 0.946 0.945 0.970 0.946 0.953 0.964 0.972 0.968 0.864 0.964 0.974 0.972 
K = 3 0.922 0.921 0.956 0.923 0.926 0.946 0.957 0.952 0.796 0.948 0.960 0.959 
K = 4 0.904 0.902 0.945 0.905 0.894 0.935 0.946 0.942 0.755 0.938 0.948 0.951 
K = 5 0.884 0.883 0.937 0.885 0.845 0.925 0.937 0.934 0.718 0.929 0.937 0.945 
             For K = 5:             
Benefit of active CEO - -0.001 0.053* 0.001 - 0.080* 0.092* 0.089* - 0.211* 0.219* 0.227* 
Portion of time that firm is still 
wandering after period 80 0.0% 0.0% 2.3% 0.0% 30.3% 0.0% 0.1% 0.0% 71.6% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Number of sticking points 9.2 9.2 4.0 9.2 4.9 4.9 2.9 4.9 4.3 4.3 4.0 4.3 
Average height of sticking points 0.857 0.857 0.921 0.857 0.903 0.903 0.939 0.903 0.913 0.913 0.917 0.913 
N = 6, aaabbb, INCENT = 0.  R indicates rubberstamping CEO.  Performance for each level of K is an average over 10,000 landscapes.  Sticking point results are an average over 500 landscapes.  
Differences denoted by * are significant with p < 0.001. 
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TABLE 5—INTERDEPENDENCY BETWEEN ACTIVE CEO AND DECOMPOSITION 
Firm 5A 5B 5C 5D 
Decision allocation aaabbb aaabbb aabbba aabbba 
ALTCEO R 3 R 3 
P - 2 - 2 
     
Performance in period 100 0.937 0.936 0.898 0.979 
Benefit of active CEO - -0.001 - 0.081* 
Portion of time that firm is still 
wandering after period 80 0.0% 0.0% 22.1% 0.0% 
Number of sticking points 4.1 4.1 1.8 1.8 
Height of average sticking point 0.916 0.916 0.897 0.968 
N = 6, block-diagonal I, INCENT = 0, ALTSUB = 1.  R indicates rubberstamping CEO.  Performance in 
each period is an average over 10,000 landscapes.  Sticking point results are an average over 500 
landscapes.  Differences denoted by * are significant with p < 0.001. 
 
 
 
FIGURE 1—EXAMPLES OF INFLUENCE M ATRICES (N = 6) 
 
      A              B                  C         D 
            Independence                Full interaction                        Block-diagonal                   Random influence (K = 2) 
ú
ú
ú
ú
ú
ú
ú
ú
û
ù
ê
ê
ê
ê
ê
ê
ê
ê
ë
é
x
x
x
x
x
x
         
ú
ú
ú
ú
ú
ú
ú
ú
û
ù
ê
ê
ê
ê
ê
ê
ê
ê
ë
é
xxxxxx
xxxxxx
xxxxxx
xxxxxx
xxxxxx
xxxxxx
         
ú
ú
ú
ú
ú
ú
ú
ú
û
ù
ê
ê
ê
ê
ê
ê
ê
ê
ë
é
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
         
ú
ú
ú
ú
ú
ú
ú
ú
û
ù
ê
ê
ê
ê
ê
ê
ê
ê
ë
é
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
 
 
 
                              FIGURE 2—ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN ELEMENTS AND THEIR EFFECTS ON SEARCH AND STABILITY 
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